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ABSTRACT 
THE CAUSES OF DISPROPORTIONATE 
ANTIDUMPING1 
OLEKSIY ISAYENKO, ALEXANDER SHCHERBAKOV 
The share of antidumping investigations against transition economies in 
the total number of investigations is much higher then their share in 
the world trade. Moreover, it increased from 20 to over than 40 
percent during the last decade. There are two opposite explanations of 
these phenomena among economists. One group argues that such 
large number of antidumping investigations is caused by direct and 
indirect subsidies to exporters in transition economies. Others see the 
main cause in the inability of transition economies to protect their 
interests in international trade. In this paper, the authors develop an 
econometric model that evaluates the comparative weight of each 
factor that influences the antidumping activity against transition 
economies.
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1 
PREFACE TO THE FINAL REPORT2 
We had several major objectives while developing our preliminary 
investigation into the final report. First, we have tried to incorporate the 
experts’ comments by improving econometric methodology. Second, we 
devoted significant efforts to gathering  of industry level data. Thirdly, we 
performed econometric analysis at industry level and finally, we extended 
the analysis by making a case study of an AD investigation in USA 
against Ukrainian metallurgy 
In our preliminary report we have made an analysis on country level data 
on over 100 countries. Doing the analysis we realized that there are 
specification problems / doubts which could only be resolved by the use 
of higher level of data disaggregation. In the final report we changed 
econometric methodology to some extent by introducing several new 
variables and by selecting fixed effect estimation procedure. We managed 
to gather data on industry level and obtained the results that are logically 
consistent and that are in compliance with our previous findings. 
In order to verify the econometric results by the real case study and also 
for demonstrative purposes we conducted a case study of the United 
States International Trade Commission Anti-dumping Investigations Nos. 
731-TA-989-908 “Hot-rolled steel products from Argentina, China, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Romania, South Africa, Taiwan, and 
Ukraine” where we paid special attention to the Ukraine case. We 
examined in details the factors that are taken into account by domestic 
industry petitioners as well as by AD investigating bodies. 
                                          
2 Authors are particularly grateful for the valuable comments to James Leitzel, Slinko Irina, 
Leonid Polishchuk, Shlomo Weber, Judith Thornton 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem 
The outburst of anti-dumping (henceforth AD) actions during the last two 
decades has been one of the troublesome trends in world trade. The 
spread of AD increased from a few traditional users, such as Australia, 
Canada, the EC, New 
Zealand and the US 
to a growing number 
of new users, among 
which are Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Korea, 
Mexico, Turkey, South 
Africa.  
During the 90s the 
share of AD cases against economies in transition has been 
disproportionate to 
their trade 
volumes. Moreover, 
it has been growing 
steadily and 
reached 43% in 
1999. 
The literature and 
personal interviews 
with experts in the 
field has shown an ambiguity of assessments of disproportionate AD use 
against transition economies: 
“AD is not being used in the spirit of the GATT rules. It is operating in 
practice as de facto protectionist device “ 
Hindley B. 1988, Dumping and the Far East Trade 
of the European Community, The World Economy 
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“I agree that here (in AD use – auth) there is a share of protectionism, 
lobbying of particular industries’ interests, but I think that it is not 
determinative. The major reason is in institutions, which leads to 
dumping through subsidies. As a result antidumping arises.“ 
Professor of Economics 
Pennsylvania State University 
Field: Institutions 
“Russia and Ukraine dump. I am totally confident in that. That is why 
they are targeted by antidumping investigations “ 
Professor of Economics 
Pennsylvania State University 
Field: International trade 
Many Ukrainian economists agree that non-market economy status was a 
decisive reason in the antidumping negotiation of EC commission against 
three producers of seamless pipes from Ukraine. 
Research objectives 
Given the above, the major purpose of the research is to define which of 
the following or which combination of the following is a source of 
disproportional antidumping activity: either it is tendency of targeted 
economies to dump often or it is protectionist nature of AD use in 
initiating countries and inability of targeted economies to protect their 
rights in the international arena or other reasons that are not related to 
dumping. 
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LITERATURE SURVEY 
The debates among economists-researchers about the reasons of 
appearance of antidumping investigations have taken place for rather 
long time already. Many of scientists agree that antidumping represents 
one form of protectionism and most often is caused by lobbying of 
countries-importers’ producers: 
“AD is a trouble-making diplomacy, stupid economics, and unprincipled 
law” (Finger, 1993) 
“AD is not being used in the spirit of the GATT rules. It is operating in 
practice as de facto protectionist device” (Hindley, 1988) 
“Reduction of AD methods use would increase (economic) efficiency and 
consumers’ gains in all countries” (Michalopoulos, 1999)  
On the other hand there is much less unanimity about the other side of 
antidumping: What are the factors that determines AD activity, or in 
other words, why some countries are more often targeted by AD while 
there are few investigations against others? 
Many of researchers see the weakness of the countries that cannot 
protect their interests in the international trade as a major source of AD 
susceptibility:  
McGee, Yoon (1998) notes that the lack of status of market economy 
would allow exporter to fully protect its interests during the investigation 
is named the major reason for the initiation of AD investigations against 
China3).  
Ehrenhaft, Hindley, Michalopoulos & Winters (1997), Finger (1993) 
argues that with the criterion of “non-market economy” EU and USA use 
                                          
3 The authors give several cases when AD authorities made decisions based only on the 
information provided by the companies-competitors of Chinese exporters. 
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different methods of estimation of dumping for industries of countries 
with transition economies. 
Also the membership in WTO plays significant role for a country to 
prevent AD investigations against its exporters as mentioned by Prusa 
(1999) and Isayenko O. (2000)4).  
Some researchers name the other reasons. A group of scientists agrees 
that antidumping is used mainly against those enterprises and industries, 
which are supported by government subsidies both direct and indirect 
(Goldstein, Judish L., Krasner, Stephen D. (1984), Hillman, Arye L., 
Ursprung, Heinrich W. (1998)).  
Michalopoulos (1999) mentions that weak fundamental market 
institutions of targeted countries put obstacles on their way to effective 
integration in world trade system thus causing more AD against it. 
Knetter & Prusa (2000) stresses that weakening of a targeted country’s 
national currency influences AD authorities’ decision5. The researchers 
also found that real GDP decline causes an increase in AD investigations6. 
There are also few works that aims to define the causes of AD activity 
using econometric tools. The papers described below played significant 
role in developing the research. 
Two works devoted to determination of factors that influences AD activity 
are those of P.K.M. Tharakan, J. Waelbroek “Determinants of Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions of the European 
                                          
4 In his work “Antidumping as strategic behavior” Isayenko O. with the use of econometric 
analysis showed that countries-members of WTO are less targeted by AD investigations 
from their trading partners. 
5 In this work Knetter & Prusa conducted a research where they found that macroeconomic 
factors as a whole and real exchange rate in particular influence the probability of 
acceptance of both of AD investigations criteria - LTFV (less than fair value) criteria and 
material injury criteria. The real appreciation (depreciation) increases (decreases) the 
probability of injury and decreases (increases) the probability of LTFV. Empirical 
investigation showed that real appreciation of country-complainant national currency in 
size of one (two) standard deviations leads to 33% (77%) increase in AD investigations. 
6 Authors found that the fall in GDP growth by one standard deviation leads to 23% increase 
in number of AD investigations 
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Communities” and “Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the 
EC and in the US”. In these works the authors use the paradigm 
described in the work of J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall, Douglas R. Nelson 
“The Political Economy of Administered Protection” in which authors 
distinguish between political track variables and technical track variables 
that influences AD activity. Based on such segregation the authors 
developed the specification that allowed to make the following 
conclusions: 
- Technical track variables dominates in LTFV pricing investigation 
- Political track variables dominates in domestic industry injury 
investigation 
- Centrally planned economies are more often targeted by AD 
In our research we tried to incorporate the described in the literature 
numerous factors to check their significance with the use of econometric 
specification based on industry-level data.  
7 
THE MODEL, SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLES 
Econometric model employed in the paper consists of three parts. The 
first one is devoted to the evaluation of factors that might influence total 
number of AD initiations against a particular industry. The second stage 
of the research involves deeper into the very nature of decision-making 
process of trade commissions. In particular, quantitative analysis aims at 
the determinants of the probability to succeed in AD investigations. 
Finally, since the weight of particular factors is likely to vary from 
dumping to injury decision, their relative importance is tested in the third 
stage of the quantitative analysis. 
TABLE 1. Dependent variables7 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
NAD 
Total number of AD investigations. Measured as sum of 
AD initiations against a particular industry of a particular 
country started by other countries in the sample in a 
given year. 
AF_NAD 
Share of affirmative decisions in the total number of 
investigations. Measured as simple ratio of the number of 
positive decisions against a particular industry of a 
particular country to the total number of investigations in 
a given year: [ ]1,0_ ∈NADAF . 
DD_NAD8 
Share of affirmative dumping decisions in the total 
number of investigations. Measured as a ratio of the 
number of dumping decisions against a particular industry 
of a particular country to the total number of 
investigations in a given year: [ ]1,0_ ∈NADDD  
Before presenting formal specifications of each stage it is worth to outline 
briefly theoretical considerations behind the choice of the RHS variables. 
                                          
7 As it can be seen from the dependent variables description, OLS estimation procedure 
would produce linear probability models for all equations except one with the dependent 
variable NAD. 
8 AD procedure assumes the following sequence of the investigation: (1) find dumping and 
(2) find injury, and affirmative decision concerning AD measures is approved only if both 
criteria are satisfied. In this case regression for the probability of affirmative decisions 
would exactly reproduce the regression for the probability of injury decision, which is 
redundant. 
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Theoretical background 
Although antidumping institutions including legal authorities and 
legislation as well as the very investigation procedures differ across 
countries it is possible to define a set of criteria that are more or less 
common. Such criteria were extensively elaborated in several theoretical 
and empirical investigations (see for example, Tharakan & Waelbroeck, 
1992 & 1994; Finger, Hall and Nelson, 1982; etc.). In this research, 
there was done a trial to extend existing models in several directions 
without making it completely inconsistent with previously used 
methodologies.  
The objective of the quantitative analysis presented below is to determine 
the influence of political and economic variables on the number of 
antidumping cases and probability of affirmative decision. 
Industry’s power. It is rational to expect that more “important” industries 
would be protected with greater ardor. Industry size should be a good 
proxy for such an “importance”. That is why, using VA structures of 
manufacturing sector we introduce VA share as a proxy, which should 
positively influence both the number of investigations and the probability 
of affirmative decision. 
Degree of involvement into the international trade. Trade pattern of the 
industry to be defended is expected to be important in antidumping 
proceedings. Clearly, the higher the imports the more protection should 
the industry seek and obtain. At the same time, export orientation of the 
domestic industry would mean that it is sufficiently competitive and 
requires relatively less protection, which is purely economic factor. 
Moreover, the more industry is export oriented the more it would be 
sensitive to the retaliation measures in the form of AD or other 
protectionist mechanisms. That is why it is rational to expect that 
antidumping activity would be lower for the industries having greater net 
exports. 
Degree of support. Promotion of the industry at the international or 
domestic markets by the exporting country’s authorities is definitely an 
9 
important factor in the AD proceedings. Highly subsidized industry would 
likely to be hardly attacked by its less subsidized competitors. It is 
important to note that relative subsidization levels are more important 
here than level of support in absolute value. We utilize subsidies ratio 
variable to take into account this factor. 
Industry’s development pattern. Injury criteria in the AD investigations 
require explicit considerations of the current conditions in the industry 
expected to be subject to defense. That is why we included index of 
industrial production into the model. At the same time, one could expect 
endogenouty problem, which arises because of bi-directional causality 
between dependent and independent variables. Namely, it is true that 
industry, which sits at the bottom side of the business cycle, is more 
likely to search for protection and, thus, is much more likely to apply with 
antidumping suite. However, the opposite is exactly true: if industry is 
successful enough in its complaints and is well protected then it would be 
more likely at the upsurge in production. For these reasons, index of 
industrial production can only be included into the specification, where 
probability of affirmative decision is evaluated, since the endogenouty 
problem here is not severe.  
Status. Internationally accepted status of the affected country may be of 
no less importance than other mentioned parameters. In particular, WTO 
membership indicating general compliance of the affected country’s 
institutions with the international principles might result in less 
discretionary decision-making by trade authorities. At the same time, it is 
important to mention two opposite effects of WTO membership. On the 
one hand, different procedures of AD investigations against non-market 
(non-WTO members) economies adds more flexibility to the decision-
making authorities and, thus, ceteris paribus assuming pro-domestic 
their orientation, might significantly increase probability of affirmative 
decisions and vice versa. On the other, WTO accession significantly 
reduces protectionism toolkit (tariffs, quotas, etc.), thus giving more 
weight to the AD mechanism. Direction of influence of WTO membership 
would depend on which effect dominates and is subject of the research. 
The status of transition economy may have influence on the intensity of 
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AD investigations and their outcome. For instance, it might be possible 
that transition status is an argument for discretionary decision-making, in 
particular, with respect to the procedure used to evaluate dumping. 
Economic conditions. Since macroeconomic conditions are likely to 
influence probability of affirmative decision and (to a less extent) total 
number of antidumping investigations it is rational to include them as 
control variables into econometric specifications. Among such 
macroeconomic parameters exchange rate (in both affected and initiating 
countries) and overall unemployment (in initiating country) were chosen9. 
Other control variables. Time trend should be definitely included into the 
econometric specification since there is an evidence of significant growth 
in the use of AD in the international markets10. However, it is not clear 
whether there are some dynamic tendencies in the number of successful 
its applications. Probability of affirmative decision is itself a correcting 
factor when applied to the number of AD suits. Namely, increase in the 
probability of affirmative decision would (1) increase expected net benefit 
from the suit holding expenses for its filling constant and/or (2) provide a 
signal about the findings of dumping for the rest of players. At the same 
time, increase in the number of “unjustified” complaints and 
correspondent quantity of initiations may reduce the probability of 
success measured by the ratio of affirmative decisions number to total 
number of investigations. Although the relationship can be more complex 
due to the fact that not all suits result in actual initiation, we introduce 
lagged value of dependent variable into one of the econometric 
specification specifications (see column “Results C” in the table “Main 
Results”).  
                                          
9 Since the industry-level data on unemployment was unavailable we used country-level 
index as a proxy. 
10 This growth can be attributed to two factors: (1) more intensive application of AD by its 
traditional users and (2) increase in the number of countries, which start AD activity 
recently. 
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TABLE 2. Explanatory variables11 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
T 
The variable accounts for the possible time trend in the 
development of dependent variable: [ ]5,1∈t . 
AF_NAD 
The variable is the same as described above except now it 
serves as an explanatory variable in the first stage of the 
quantitative analysis. AF_NAD(-1) represents lagged 
value of the variable. 
SR 
Subsidies rate. The variable measures the degree of 
industry’s support by governments in affected and in 
country(ies) initiator. It is calculated as ratio of subsidies 
in affected country (% of GDP) to the subsidies in 
countries trade-partners (% of GDP). Thus, the variable 
increases with the increase in affected country industry’s 
support and with fall in initiating countries industry’s 
support. 
LHW_D 
Wages differential. The binary variable takes the value 1 
IF the industry’s wage in affected country is lower than 
average for the industry (across all countries in the 
sample) in a given year AND IF the industry’s wage in 
initiating country(ies) is higher than average. 
REERCH & 
TP_REERCH 
Change in the real effective exchange rate of 
affected/initiating country(ies) over previous period. 
Positive change indicates affected/initiating country’s 
currency real appreciation.  
WTO 
WTO membership. The binary variable takes the value 1 if 
affected country is a WTO member and 0 otherwise. 
TRANS 
Transition country. The binary variable takes the value of 
1 if the affected country is transition according to the WB 
classification. 
TP_VAS 
Value added structure in manufacturing sector of initiating 
country. Measured as share of the industry’s VA in total 
VA of manufacturing sector: [ ]1,0_ ∈VASTP . 
TP_NEXP 
Net export of the initiating country. Measured as the 
industry’s export minus import. 
TP_UNEMP 
Deviation of the unemployment rate in the initiating 
country from the average unemployment rate across all 
countries in the sample  
TP_IPI 
Industrial production index for the initiating country(ies). 
Index with the value for 1995 equal to 100. 
The following is a formal representation of the three econometric 
specifications used in the research: 
                                          
11 Initial set of explanatory variables was significantly larger. Since information on some 
indicators like capital/labor ratio, industry’s employment ratios, volume of non-monetary 
transaction and indirect subsidies levels as well as industry concentration ratios is 
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Stage 1.  
)_,_,_,_
,_,,,,_,,_,(
IPITPREERCHTPUNEMPTPNEXPTP
VASTPTRANSWTOREERCHDLHWSRNADAFtfNAD =                       (1) 
Stage 2.  
)_,_,_,_
,_,,,,_,,_,(_
IPITPREERCHTPUNEMPTPNEXPTP
VASTPTRANSWTOREERCHDLHWSRNADAFtfNADAF =                 (2) 
Stage 3.  
)_,_,_,_
,_,,,,_,,_,(_
IPITPREERCHTPUNEMPTPNEXPTP
VASTPTRANSWTOREERCHDLHWSRNADAFtfNADDD =                 (3) 
Each of the equations (1) – (3) are estimated using cross-sectional time-
series (panel) dataset. Estimation is based on fixed-effect procedure 
provided by computer software Stata Intercooled 6.0. 
The data 
Data set is represented by balanced panel with time-series component 
covering 1995-1999. Cross-sectional component of the panel includes 
253 observations: 23 country and 11 two-digit (NACE classification). 
Below the list of countries and industries is presented. 
Table 3. List of countries 
COUNTRY NAD  COUNTRY NAD 
Japan 377 Ukraine 47
Korea 313  Poland 35 
United States 195  Czech Republic 27 
Germany 164  Finland 20 
Canada 155  Hungary 18 
Mexico 141  Slovak Republic 14 
Italy 123  Bulgaria 11 
France 106  Denmark 10 
United Kingdom 105  Austria 4 
Russia 100  European Community12 4 
Sweden 60  Slovenia 3 
Romania 58    
                                                                                                         
presently unavailable such variables were either dropped or replaced by proxies mentioned 
in the table 2.  
12 As simple average of member-countries parameters 
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References on the data sources and summary statistics of the data are 
presented in the Appendix YYY. It is worth noting that sometimes data on 
variables, like VA structure of production, was retrieved using different 
sources (e.g. WIIW Handbook of Statistics for transition economies and 
STAN Database for OECD countries). Although we accept rational critique 
concerning possible heterogeneity of the data collection procedure by 
different agencies, it should be noted that thorough comparison of data 
for overlapping countries, like Czech Republic, gives satisfactory results 
and we are inclined to believe that the data from these sources can 
successfully be pooled together. 
Table 4. List of industries 
INDUSTRY TITLE NAD IDENTIFIER 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 1281 DJ
Chemicals, chemical products & man-made fibers 241 DG 
Electrical and optical equipment 169 DL 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 120 DA 
Rubber and plastic products 67 DH 
Textiles and textile products 58 DB 
Manufacturing 42 DN 
Other non-metallic mineral products 40 DI 
Machinery and equipment 39 DK 
Pulp, paper, & paper product; publishing & printing 17 DE 
Wood and wood products 16 DD 
Although selection of the quite broad industry definitions may cause 
some aggregation problems, this is unavoidable taking into account focus 
of the research and resource limitations.  
Data weighting 
Presence of the several trade partners as well as several AD initiators 
required aggregation methodology. In this research double-track 
weighting procedure was chosen. The applied decision rule was as 
follows: if NAD is greater than 0 in a given year then parameters of 
initiators are weighted in accordance to their contributions to NAD, 
otherwise parameters of the four main trade partners are chosen and 
weighted by the import volumes from the affected country. 
14 
RESULTS 
The Table 5 “Main Results” below represents results of the econometric 
estimation. Technical specificity of the AD investigation, where dumping 
criterion is superior to the injury one, have led to the fact that affirmative 
decisions are exactly duplicated by the injury decisions. That is why there 
is no necessity in the evaluation of both probabilities (affirmative and 
injury decisions). Upper row of the table reproduces the dependent 
variable of each econometric specification. 
The total number of AD investigations is growing over time and beyond 
the other reasons included into the model, which was tested by the time 
trend variable having positive and significant effect. It is not surprising 
taking into account gradual substitution of the traditional protectionists 
instruments by antidumping. 
Probability of the successful completion of AD suit significantly and 
positively influences the total number of AD investigations, which might 
represent some rationality in expectations of the economic agents, real 
existence of dumping or implicit collusion between AD authorities and 
potential complainants. Lagged value of the dependent variable AF_NAD 
has negative and significant influence on its future value. Thus, it might 
be an evidence of self-correcting mechanism in the AD practice. Namely, 
it is possible that high share of affirmative decisions attracts new 
complainants seeking protection with suspicious argumentation, most of 
which receive negative decisions in the investigations, thus reducing 
share of affirmative decisions back. 
Difference in the levels of industries’ support in affected and initiating 
countries has positive and significant influence not only on the number of 
initiations, but also significantly increases the probability of affirmative 
decision. Decomposition of the dependent variable into dumping and 
injury criteria revealed that both are positively affected by the variable. 
In other words, the heavier affected country’s industries are subsidized 
and the lower such support in the countries trade partners the more 
cases will be initiated and their outcome becomes less favorable for the 
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affected country since it is more likely to be accused in dumping and 
proved that this has harmed its competitor.  
Difference in wage levels across affected and initiating countries 
industries has positive but insignificant influence on the total number of 
initiations as well as on their result. Having in mind the relationship 
between the probability of affirmative decision and satisfaction of injury 
criterion, coefficient analysis may lead to a proposition that wade 
differential is relatively more important for the injury rather than for 
dumping decision, which is obvious. 
Appreciation (increase in REER) of the exporter’s currency has negative, 
but insignificant effect on both the number of investigations and their 
results. The only marginal significance was found in the third specification 
on the analysis of the probability of affirmative decision (Results (C) 
column). 
WTO membership country status was found to have insignificant 
influence on the number of investigations13. At the same time, significant 
positive influence of the variable on both the probability of the affirmative 
decision and the dumping criterion compliance may lead to a conclusion 
that protectionists effect outweighs the effect of presence of sound and 
internationally accepted trade institutions. Another possible explanation is 
that WTO-member status restrains potential complainants from bringing 
cases to courts if their justification is not sufficiently strong. 
Status of transition economy is not likely to serve as an argument for the 
extra number of AD investigations14. However, its positive influence on 
the probability of affirmative decision as well as on the probability of 
finding dumping presents evidence of the discriminatory practices with 
respect to transition economies. It is not surprising because special 
treatment of the transition economies may add flexibility to the 
                                          
13 Which was the case in the country level analysis (see Appendix 3). In both specifications 
present and that listed in Appendix 3 the sign was negative. 
14 At the country level analysis this factor was positive and significant (Appendix 3). 
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procedure of investigation. As long as AD may at least partially serve as a 
protectionist instrument such flexibility may be used in favor of 
investigator thus exposing transition economy to a relatively higher rate 
of punishment. 
Importance of the industry for the manufacturing sector of initiating 
country proved to have significant positive influence on the number of 
investigations. However, while positive it appears to be insignificant with 
respect to the probability of affirmative decision. Particularly strange 
result appears when the variable is introduced to the third stage 
regression. Namely, it has positive and significant at 10% critical interval 
influence on the probability of finding dumping. 
Export orientation of initiating country negatively influences the number 
of investigations, thus supporting theoretical hypothesis raised in the 
previous section. Besides, it has positive however non-robust effect on 
the probability of affirmative decision and, what is interesting, positively 
influences the probability of finding dumping. In fact this is not 
unexpected since export oriented industry is more likely to be 
competitive and thus would involve itself in the AD investigation only 
having significantly strong arguments for such a case.  
Relatively high level of the unemployment in the country-initiator has 
expected positive, but insignificant influence on the number of AD 
investigations and was found having no influence on the rest of 
dependent variables. 
Appreciation of domestic currency in the countries-initiators turned out to 
be positively, but insignificantly related to the number of investigations 
and to the probability of affirmative decision. At the same time, negative 
influence of the strong domestic currency on the probability of finding 
dumping may testify for the discrepancy between the total number of 
cases brought to the court and those having strong background behind 
them. 
Finally, industries’ growth would result in a lower number of affirmative 
decisions. Taking into account insignificant influence of the industrial 
17 
performance on the dumping definition (which is obvious), this result 
[negative influence on the share of affirmative decisions] provided 
evidence that some part of the affirmative decisions is lost primary 
because of no finding of injury to domestic industry. 
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Table 5. Main Results 
 19 
USA AD AGAINST UKRAINIAN METALLURGY 
The purpose of this case-study was to verify the econometric results by 
the real case study and also for demonstrative purposes. 
For the case-study we have chosen the United States International 
Trade Commission Anti-dumping Investigations Nos. 731-TA-989-908 
“Hot-rolled steel products from Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Romania, South Africa, Taiwan, and 
Ukraine”. We paid special attention to the Ukraine case, although 
where it was appropriate made comparisons with other countries. The 
choice of this investigation was determined by the following factors: 
This case is ‘typical’: metallurgy is most often targeted industry, USA is 
the major user of AD legislation, it is usual that several countries are 
examined together. 
This case is ‘recent’: it started in late 2000 and final decision was made 
in the middle of 2001. 
A large piece of information on this case was in author’s abilities to 
obtain 
For the purposes of clarity we organized the presentation of the case 
study as following: First we describe the usual procedures of AD 
investigation in US. Then we present the chronic of the case and major 
findings/results. Finally the most important features are described that 
relate to this paper’s objectives, i.e. factors that determine AD use. 
The procedures of antidumping investigation 
According to the GATT-WTO standards and US AD legislation two major 
conditions should be satisfied for dumping to be proved: 
1. Product price is set up below the cost of its production 
2. Export of the product harms domestic production of the 
country-importer 
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The procedure of AD investigation is as follows: 
1. Domestic enterprise or a group of enterprises apply for AD 
investigation of particular product’s imports 
2. The agencies (ITA and USITS in US) conducts AD investigation 
where two factors, both of which are necessary for affirmative 
conclusion, are under examination: 
a. Imports at ‘less then fair value’ (LTFV) price 
b. Injury to domestic industry by such imports  
The following steps are made during an investigation: 
1. The scope of investigation is defined 
a. The list of is defined taking into account physical 
conditions, end use, interchangeability, distribution 
channels, production process and employment 
conditions, producers and consumers views, and 
differences in prices 
b. The domestic industry and the list of enterprises are 
defined on the basis of sources and size of capital 
investments, value added, employment level, other 
factors 
c. The related parties are defined 
2. The existing of dumping from importing producers 
a. Import price is defined based on ‘best information 
available’ 
b. Normal value is found based on methods differing for 
different countries under examination 
c. Dumping margin (if any) is calculated based on the 
above 
3. The economic conditions of the industry and economic factors 
that influenced such indicators as output, sales, inventories, 
capacity utilization, market share, employment, wages, 
productivity, profits, cash flows, return on investments, capital 
formation ability, research activity 
4. The material injury to domestic industry is defined taking into 
account the volume of imports under consideration and the 
influence of imports onto price formation at the market 
The chronic of the case and major findings/results 
On November 13, 2000, the Department of Commerce received 
petitions filed in proper form. The petitioners alleged that imports of 
certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products is sold in the United States 
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at less than fair value, and that such imports are materially injuring an 
industry in the United States. The dumping margin calculated by the 
petitioners for Ukraine was from 85.20 to 86.68 percent. After the 
examination of the petitions on December 12, 2000 Import 
Administration of International Trade Administration’s Department of 
Commerce initiated AD Duty Investigations: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products From Argentina, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the 
Netherlands, the People's Republic of China, Romania, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine. The scope of investigations was defined 
as follows: 
The period of investigation (POI) for market economy countries is 
October 1, 1999, through September 30, 2000, while the POI for non-
market economies (NME) is April 1, 2000, through September 30, 
2000. 
On December 4, 2000 the conference was held in Washington, DC, , 
and all persons who requested the opportunity were permitted to 
appear in person or by counsel. 
In its preliminary investigation The Commission found that there is a 
threat of injury by imports sold below cost. The Commission 
recalculated estimated dumping margins and ranged them for Ukraine 
from 89.13 to 89.49 percent. 
In its final report The Commission determined, that an industry in the 
United States is materially injured by reason of imports from China, 
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Romania, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and Ukraine of hot rolled steel products, that have been found by the 
Department of Commerce to be sold in the United States at less than 
fair value (LTFV). 
Commerce modified the dumping margins from its preliminary 
determinations. For Ukraine it was defined as 90.33 percent. The 
changes to the margins do not alter our conclusion that the domestic 
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industry producing hot-rolled steel is materially injured by reason of 
subject imports. 
Most important features of the investigation 
Initiation 
It was stated in the report of the Commerce that the petitioners 
represent significant part of the industry which account for 20 
enterprises – the fact that gives reason to presume that industry 
concentration is important factor of AD initiation as it is less costly to 
cooperate for fewer parties. 
NME status of targeted economy is important for initioation of an 
investigation against it: that will be shown later in dumping 
investigation description that it is less costly to gather data and prove 
to ITC that NME dumps into US market. Of course this factor may be 
not decisive during the initiation phase. 
The importance of an exporter’s share in the market is reduced since it 
is not necessary that a single country-exporter possesses a significant 
share of the market: “Of the eleven countries subject to antidumping 
duty investigations, five are individually at negligible levels as 
determined by their respective shares of total imports: Argentina, 1.74 
percent; Kazakhstan, 2.92 percent; South Africa, 2.19 percent; 
Thailand, 2.26 percent; and Ukraine, 2.69 percent. However, the sum 
of the shares of these countries, at 11.8 percent, exceeds the seven 
percent aggregate share for negligibility set by statute. Therefore … 
subject imports from none of these countries are negligible for 
purposes of the antidumping duty investigations”. Correspondingly the 
Commission found the volume of cumulated subject imports, both in 
absolute terms and relative to consumption in the United States, to be 
significant. 
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Total import share is important: Much of the Commission’s views 
focuses first on merchant market data (volumes that exclude captive 
production15) and secondly on total market data. 
Injury is important for petitioners: as it will be seen from injury 
investigation description the injury to domestic industry (presented 
mainly by import volumes) is also a significant factor of AD initiation. 
Dumping investigation 
The assumptions on input prices were one of the major factors of 
dumping finding in this investigation: The petitioners based NV for 
sales in the Netherlands on Constructed Value (CV). The petitioners 
calculated CV using the same COM, depreciation, SG&A expenses, and 
interest expense figures used to compute the home market costs, that 
is practically took their own cost. The petitioners included in CV an 
amount for profit which was based on the profit of a surrogate Dutch 
equipment manufacturer. Based upon the comparison of EP to CV, the 
Commission recalculated the dumping margin for Netherlands. 
It is both easier to file against NME and prove dumping during the 
investigation: it is stated that Ukraine is an NME country, and in all 
previous investigations, the Department has determined that Ukraine is 
an NME. Ukraine will be treated as an NME unless and until its NME 
status is revoked. The Department presumes, based on the extent of 
central government control in an NME that a single dumping margin, 
should there be one, is appropriate for all NME exporters in the given 
country. Because Ukraine's status as an NME remains in effect, the 
                                          
15 The captive production provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv), provides: (iv) CAPTIVE 
PRODUCTION -- If domestic producers internally transfer significant production of the 
domestic like product for the production of a downstream article and sell significant 
production of the domestic like product in the merchant market, and the Commission 
finds that --(I) the domestic like product produced that is internally transferred for 
processing into that downstream article does not enter the merchant market for the 
domestic like product, (II) the domestic like product is the predominant material input 
in the production of that downstream article, and (III) the production of the domestic 
like product sold in the merchant market is not generally used in the production of that 
downstream article, then the Commission, in determining market share and the factors 
affecting financial performance set forth in clause (iii), shall focus primarily on the 
merchant market for the domestic like product. 
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petitioners determined the dumping margin using an FOP analysis: 
Given that information regarding the Ukrainian mills' consumption rates 
is not available, the petitioners calculated NV using the following 
methodology: the petitioners used Indonesia as the surrogate country. 
For NV, the petitioners based the FOP, on the consumption rates of one 
U.S. hot-rolled steel producer, assumed, for purposes of the petition, 
that producers in Ukraine use the same inputs in the same quantities 
as the petitioners use petitioners argue that the use of the petitioners' 
factors is conservative because the U.S. steel industry is more efficient 
than the Ukrainian steel industry. The petitioners assert that Indonesia 
is the most appropriate surrogate country for Ukraine, claiming that 
Indonesia is: (1) A market economy; (2) a significant producer of 
comparable merchandise; and (3) at a level of economic development 
comparable to Ukraine in terms of per capita GNP. The materials were 
primarily valued based on Indonesian import values, as published in 
the UN Trade Commodity Statistics. Labor was valued using the 
regression-based wage rate for Ukraine provided by the Department. 
We have found that this rate is calculated as GNP per capita. Electricity 
was valued using the rate for Indonesia published in a quarterly report 
of the OECD's International Energy Agency. For overhead, SG&A 
expenses and profit, the petitioners applied rates derived from the 
public annual report of an Indonesian producer of subject merchandise, 
PT Krakatau Steel. All surrogate values which fell outside the POI were 
adjusted for inflation based on the currency in which the source data 
were reported. The Indonesian consumer price index or the PPI, as 
published by the International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics, was used for these adjustments. Based upon a comparison 
of EP to CV, the Commission recalculated estimated dumping margins 
ranging from 89.13 to 89.49 percent. 
Injury 
The importance of an exporter’s share in the market is reduced by the 
reasons explained in Initiation section: For purposes of the 
investigation, the Commission found the volume of cumulated subject 
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imports, both in absolute terms and relative to consumption in the 
United States, to be significant. 
Prices dynamics: The Commission took into account that “cumulated 
subject imports have depressed domestic prices to a significant degree 
or prevented price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to 
a significant degree”. 
Other factors: Capacity utilization rates (peaked in the first quarter of 
2000 and have since fallen), orders (for the third quarter of 2000 were 
lower than for any other third quarter of the survey period), the 
domestic industry’s share of both the merchant and total markets (was 
lower in interim 2000 than in interim 1999). One of the firms in 
bankruptcy before the filing of this petition, Gulf States, has ceased 
operations, and since this petition was filed, an additional firm, WPS, 
has also filed for bankruptcy – the facts that were definitely taken into 
account. The number of production and related workers fell in both 
1998 and 1999.  
Inventories increased sharply, rising from 2.5 million short tons in 1997 
to 2.9 million short tons in 1999. At the end of interim 2000, 
inventories were nearly 3.0 million short tons, up from 2.8 million short 
tons in interim 1999. The ratio of inventory to shipments rose from 4.3 
percent in 1997 to 4.9 percent in 1999.  
The financial position of the industry was also named as a prove of the 
injury. It has deteriorated throughout most of the period under 
investigation. The number of firms reporting operating losses on 
commercial sales rose from 7 in 1997 to 12 in 1999. The industry 
reported operating losses on commercial sales in 1998 and those losses 
deepened in 1999.  
From 1997 through 1999, even though the domestic industry’s total 
sales quantities continuously increased, sales values decreased 
resulting in a decline in unit values per short ton over the period. 
Profits fell even as domestic producers made significant productivity 
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gains and unit production costs fell. Capital expenditures fell sharply 
between 1997 and 1999, as did expenditures for research and 
development.  
Based on these facts the Commission found that the significant and 
increasing volume of low priced cumulated subject imports had a 
significant negative impact on the U.S. industry. Accordingly, the 
Commission determined that there was a reasonable indication of 
material injury by reason of subject imports. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The present study provides the result of an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of the claims and responsible authorities’ decisions 
concerning antidumping investigations. Elements of the theory of 
political economy of protection, information gathered in different 
sources including case studies, economic articles, and communication 
with specialists in the field were used to develop econometric 
specification. Extended dataset used in the research allows testing of 
general hypotheses concerning AD investigations in modern world 
economy. We hope that our findings, which are summarized below, 
contribute to the better understanding of the recent tendencies in the 
international trade markets. 
First, industrial support from the governments can be considered 
among the top reasons for the antidumping investigations as it leads to 
the unfair competitive advantages of the selected industries. From this 
prospective antidumping may be considered as a proper game rules 
enforcement mechanism. 
Secondly, although WTO membership is considered as a good remedy 
from unjustified trade restrictions it may have two-fold effect on the 
newly accepted countries. On the one hand, it would definitely 
eliminate so-called traditional protectionism in the form of quotas and 
tariffs, which are more easily applied to non-members. On the other it 
is likely to expose member countries to the antidumping procedures, 
which serve as a protectionists measure of last resort. In this respect it 
would be unsound to believe that formal accession guarantees 
exporters’ promotion per se. Improper domestic industries control and 
management would simply result in the substitution of tariffs and 
quotas by high affirmative decisions rate in antidumping suits. 
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Thirdly, while in absolute numbers antidumping investigations against 
transition economies may be indistinguishable from the rest of 
countries, probability of being accused in dumping is significantly 
higher for the former ones. This result justifies the statement that 
transition status leads to the higher flexibility in antidumping 
proceedings and resulting in the relatively higher discretionary 
decision-making. 
The case study of US AD investigation against Ukrainian metallurgy 
gave us the possibility to make conclusions about AD procedure in USA 
in details. The major findings do not contradict our econometric 
analysis: 
Among the factors that influence AD initiation are NME status of 
targeted economy, concentration of domestic industry, total import 
share  
The assumptions on input prices were one of the major factors of 
dumping finding in this investigation. Additionally, it is both easier to 
file against NME and prove dumping during the investigation. 
The injury decision is under the influence or a range of factors: prices 
dynamics, capacity utilization rates, number of orders, bankruptcy 
cases, the number of workers, inventories, the financial position of the 
industry. 
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Appendix 1. Data Description16 
Data sources 
MAIN VARIABLES SOURCE 
• Number of AD initiations 
• Number of affirmative decisions 
• Number of dumping decisions 
WTO semiannual reports. Electronic versions: 
www.wto.org (1995-99) 
• Volume of subsidies (as % of GDP, country-
level) 
World development indicator CD (1999) 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. IMF edition, 
2001. 
• Average monthly gross wages in 
manufacturing (NACE classification) 
Countries in Transition. WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 
2001. 
STAN database, 2001. 
• REER (country level) IFS CD, 2001. 
• WTO membership (country-level) WTO website: www.wto.org 
• Structure of production in manufacturing 
industry (% of total, NACE classification) 
Countries in Transition. WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 
2001. 
STAN database. 2001. 
• Export/Import volume across manufacturing 
industries 
STAN database, 2001 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), electronic version, 
2001. 
• Unemployment (country-level) 
IFS CD, 2001. 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), electronic version, 
2001. 
• Industrial production index 
STAN database 
Countries in Transition. WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 
2001. 
• GDP growth (country-level) IFS CD, 2001. 
• Main trade partners with volumes of 
export/import transactions (country-level) 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), electronic version, 
2001. 
 
 
                                          
16 Data is assumed to be industry-level if other is not mentioned. 
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Summary statistics of the variables employed 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MAX 
NAD 1265 1.652174 5.067812 0 58 
AF_NAD 1265 0.129833 0.279108 0 1 
SR 1265 0.9909744 0.5581905 0.2374065 4.446398 
LHW_D 1265 0.1328063 0.3394995 0 1 
REERCH 1265 0.0292904 0.1255661 -.2932937 0.8839472 
WTO 1265 0.8956522 0.3058321 0 1 
TRANS 1265 0.3913043 0.4882353 0 1 
TP_VAS 1265 0.0766666 0.0406788 0.0157811 0.2078225 
TP_NEXP 1265 -1077.802 11778.17 -50612.66 39030.91 
TP_UNEMP 1265 -1.73e-09 2.363509 -6.756098 5.083507 
TP_REERCH 1265 0.0164351 0.0737144 -0.2587298 0.8839472 
TP_IPI 1265 103.96 8.424362 77.5652 179.2001 
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Appendix 2. Fixed effects 
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Appendix 2. Fixed effects (continue form the previous page) 
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Appendix 3. Country-level analysis 
Although the ultimate target of the paper is analysis of the antidumping investigations determinants at industry 
level, more general approach using country-level data can be considered as a useful exercise. Such an 
analysis provides valuable information not only about appropriateness of econometric specification, but also 
about the behavior of main variables at higher level of data aggregation. Besides, double-check of the findings 
may serve as an additional test for the robustness of the obtained results. For these reasons we present brief 
outline of the econometric results obtained using country level dataset. 
The model was represented by two major econometric specifications, which differ from the current analysis by 
the level of aggregation, quantity of variables to be tested, and a set of technical control variables: 
),__,__,_
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IMPPUADPDDADPGNPROP
PUPROPDDPROPRECESSGPCGNPSUBSUNEMPLTRANSWTOfNAD =  
 (1) 
and 
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PUPROPDDPROPRECESSGPCGNPSUBSUNEMPLTRANSWTOfCTOTAF =  (2) 
where the list of variables with definitions is presented below. 
 
VARIABLE D E S C R I P T I O N  S O U R C E  
NAD 
Number of antidumping investigations against exporting country in 
a particular year (1995-1999). Corresponds to Nad in Methodology 
and preliminary results’ Description of the variables 
WTO Reports of the 
Committee on AD 
Practices 1995 - 1999 
AF_TOT_C 
Share of affirmative decisions out of NAD (affirmative decision 
means imposition of a definitive duty or price undertaking). 
Corresponds to AF/TOT in Methodology and preliminary results’ 
Description of the variables 
WTO Reports of the 
Committee on AD 
Practices 1995 - 1999 
WTO 
WTO membership of exporting country, dummy (1 – for WTO 
members, 0 – otherwise). Corresponds to VTO_Member in 
Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the variables 
WTO 
TRANS 
Transition economies, dummy for exporting countries (1 for 
transition economy, 0 otherwise). Corresponds to Type in 
Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the variables 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
SUBS 
Subsidies volume in exporting country as % of GDP. Corresponds to 
SV in Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the 
variables.  
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
GNP_PC_G 
Growth in GNP per capita in importing country, %. Corresponds to 
REC in Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the 
variables. 
IMF: Government 
Financial Statistics 
RECESS 
Recession in importing country, dummy (1 if GDP growth is 
negative, 0 otherwise). Corresponds to REC in Methodology and 
preliminary results’ Description of the variables. 
Authors’ calculation 
using the data from IMF: 
Government Financial 
Statistics 
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VARIABLE D E S C R I P T I O N  S O U R C E  
UNEMP 
Unemployment in importing country, %. Corresponds to REC in 
Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the variables. 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, International 
Labor Organization 
IMP 
Volume of imports of importing country from a particular affected 
country as % of GDP of importing country. Corresponds to IMV in 
Methodology and preliminary results’ Description of the variables. 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
PROP_GN 
Propensity of exporting country to dump, cumulative number of 
antidumping investigations against a particular country for 
1995/1999. Corresponds to MADC in Methodology and preliminary 
results’ description of the variables. 
Authors’ calculation 
using WTO data 
PROP_DD 
Propensity of exporting country to be subject to dumping decisions, 
average share of dumping decisions out of NAD for 1995/1999 
across all importing countries.  
Authors’ calculation 
using WTO data 
PROP_PU 
Propensity of exporting country to be subject to price undertakings 
measure, average share of price undertaking decisions out of NAD 
for 1995/1999 across all importing countries.  
Authors’ calculation 
using WTO data 
P_AD_DD 
Propensity of importing countries to be engaged in AD investigation 
with resulting dumping decision, constructed as average share of 
dumping decisions made by importing countries out of total 
investigations initiated by the importing countries in 1995/1999.  
Authors’ calculation 
using WTO data 
P_AD_PU 
Propensity of importing countries to be engaged in AD investigation 
with resulting price undertaking decision, constructed as average 
share of price undertaking decisions made by importing countries 
out of total investigations initiated by the importing countries in 
1995/1999.  
Authors’ calculation 
using WTO data 
Several points worth noting: 
The use of country-level data imposes some restrictions. Namely, the number of antidumping investigations 
against the country may depend heavily on the degree of its trade diversification; and the structure and the 
volumes of exported products may vary greatly from one importer to another. While these problems are less 
severe at industry level, one should account for such restrictions while interpreting the results of the 
quantitative analysis at country level. 
Since all variable can be broadly divided into two categories: affected country’s indicators and initiating country 
indicators, the method of representative importer construction was chosen. Under this transformation 
variables that refer to importing (initiating) countries are constructed by weighting by import volumes (from 
exporting to importing country) in the following way: 
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where AD is the number of AD initiations, E is a vector of affected country parameters, O is a vector of initiating 
country parameters, and W is weight as defined above. 
The data employed include 106 affected countries in 1995-99. 
Methodology of propensity indexes calculation is briefly outlined in the Box 1 and results of econometric 
estimation is presented in the Table 6. 
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Box 1. Variables calculation methodology 
 
TABLE 6. Country-level estimation results 
 
Results interpretation 
As it can be seen from the table above, country-level analysis results almost perfectly correspond to the results 
of industry-level analysis. Namely, key indicators like WTO membership, transition status, unemployment 
level, subsidies volume, and growth proxy (especially if significant in both cases) do not differ in their signs. 
Difference in the statistical significance can be attributed to the different aggregation levels as well as 
dissimilar proxy variables used (like for the industrial support control variable). General compliance of the 
results obtained at different levels of data aggregation can be considered as evidence in favor of model 
chosen and robustness of the inferences made. 
 
